Spaghetti and noodles. Why is the developing country differentiation landscape so complex? by Fialho de Oliveira Ramos, D.N. (Djalita) & Bergeijk, P.A.G. (Peter) van
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
No. 563 
 
 
Spaghetti and noodles 
Why is the developing country differentiation landscape so 
complex? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Djalita Fialho 
 
Peter A.G. van Bergeijk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2013 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0921-0210 
 
The Institute of Social Studies is Europe’s longest-established centre of higher education and research in development 
studies. On 1 July 2009, it became a University Institute of the Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR). Post-graduate 
teaching programmes range from six-week diploma courses to the PhD programme. Research at ISS is fundamental in 
the sense of laying a scientific basis for the formulation of appropriate development policies. The academic work of ISS is 
disseminated in the form of books, journal articles, teaching texts, monographs and working papers. The Working Paper 
series provides a forum for work in progress which seeks to elicit comments and generate discussion. The series includes 
academic research by staff, PhD participants and visiting fellows, and award-winning research papers by graduate 
students. 
Working Papers are available in electronic format at www.iss.nl 
 
Please address comments and/or queries for information to: 
 Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT         4 
ACRONYMS         5 
1 INTRODUCTION         6 
2   AN OVERVIEW OF MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES          8 
3   WHY DOES THE PROLIFERATION OCCUR?       12 
3.1 International organisations      14 
3.2 Developed countries      16 
3.3 Developing countries      17 
3.4 Representatives      17 
4   CASE STUDY: LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LLDC) VERSUS SMALL ISLAND 
DEVELOPING STATES (SIDS)       18 
4.1 Observations      18 
4.2 Preliminary conclusions      24 
5  HOW TO DEAL WITH COMPLEXITY?       25 
REFERENCES           28 
APPENDICES        31 
4 
 
Abstract 
The plethora of country classifications that emerged since the star of the 1950s is a remarkable 
phenomena in the arena of development policymaking. In our sample of country classifications, 
consisting of classifications for 111 developing countries, the average number of classifications 
per country is 3.1 at the start of 2013. The developing country differentiation landscape is of 
staggering complexity. For instance, of the 49 countries categorised as Least Developed 
Countries (LDC), 17 are also Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDC), 30 are Low Income 
Countries (LIC), 18 are Lower-middle Income Countries (LMIC), 39 are Low Human 
Development (LHD), 6 are Middle Human Development (MHD), 31 are Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC), and 24 are Fragile States (FS). Through literature review, document analysis 
and a case study that compares two of these categories, the article seeks to understand (i) why 
this hybrid complex structure developed, and (ii) what are the consequences of the “spaghetti 
bowl” of country classifications; considered to be detrimental to development and global 
governance. It investigates the main similarities and differences between selected categories of 
developing countries (created within the UN, including the Bretton Woods institutions), applying 
as an analytical lens the political economy of country differentiation to explore their rationale and 
purpose. Rather than creating predictability, rationality and transparency about rules and 
principles, and protecting states against the vagaries of large countries, the proliferation of 
classifications injects the global governance system with discretion, enabling the exercise of 
power over smaller and weaker states. Finally, in order to move this debate from observation and 
diagnosis to providing some direction to policymakers, policy changes that can contribute to a 
less problematic framework of developing country differentiation are proposed. Finally, in order 
to move this debate from observation and diagnosis to providing some direction to policymakers, 
policy changes that can contribute to a less problematic framework of developing country 
differentiation are proposed. 
Keywords 
UN, World Bank, developing country classification, special and differential treatment. 
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Spaghetti and noodles  
Why is the developing country differentiation landscape so complex? 1 
1 Introduction 
Peak countries in the present landscape of developing country differentiation are the four 
MCDCs Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic and Chad.2 Afghanistan, for example, is 
a Fragile State (FS), a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC), a Land-Locked Developing 
Country (LLDC), a Least Developed Country (LDC), a Low-Income Country (LIC) and a Low 
Human Development Country (LHDC). In the lowlands of the landscape we find a group of 32 
NCDCs.3 Interestingly, the level of development does not always appear to be associated with 
the number of classifications: Equatorial Guinea is just a Middle Human Development LDC (2 
classifications), but Bolivia and Zimbabwe that are not LDCs do appear in 4 other classifications. 
Indeed, the developing country differentiation landscape is of staggering complexity. Of the 49 
countries categorised as LDCs by the start of 2013, 17 are also LLDCs, 30 are LICs, 18 are 
LMIC, 39 are LHD, 6 are MHD, 31 are HIPCs, and 24 are FS (the average number of other 
classifications in addition to being an LDC is 2.4). In our sample of country classifications that 
consists of classifications for 111 developing countries, at the start of 2013 the average number 
of classifications per country is 3.1. Commenting on this complexity Van Bergeijk and Van 
Marrewijk (2013: 1) remark:  
UNCTAD, the IMF and the World Bank seem to be involved in an intellectual competition to find 
ever-new acronyms to re-classify and re-group the developing world. The existence of CITs, CAFS, 
LDCs, LICs, LICUS, HIPCs, SIDs and SWVSEs testifies of the substantial amount of macro and 
political heterogeneity that is characteristic of what once was perceived to be a more or less coherent 
group of Third World countries.4 
In this article we seek to understand (i) why this hybrid complex structure developed and (ii) 
the consequences of the “spaghetti bowl” of country classifications (see Figure 1). Actually, as 
will become clear, this is not only a spaghetti bowl, but a mix of noodles and spaghetti created by 
different cooks and with sometimes conflicting recipes.  
To understand why all these country differentiation initiatives emerged we investigate the 
main similarities and differences between them, applying as an analytical lens the political 
economy of country differentiation (Fialho 2012) to explore the rationale and purpose of selected 
categories of developing countries created within the UN framework (including the Bretton 
Woods institutions).  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of 
selected categories of developing countries and contextualises these country differentiation 
efforts, providing a general picture of the developing country differentiation landscape and the 
special and differential treatment they entail. In order to understand the process of proliferation,  
                                                 
1 Comments by Susan Newman and André Corsino Tolentino are gratefully acknowledged. 
2 MCDC stands for Most Classified Developing Countries. 
3 The NCDCs are the Not Classified Developing Countries that we define as the countries that are not the 
high income countries in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and that also do not appear in 
the country classifications that we study in this article. 
4 The acronyms stand for Countries In Transition, Conflict Affected and Fragile States, Least Developed 
Countries, Low Income countries, Low Income Countries Under Stress, Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries, Small Island Developing States and Structurally Weak, Vulnerable and Small Economies. 
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FIGURE 1 
 The “spaghetti bowl” of overlapping categories of developing countries 
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section 3 analyses the drivers of the main players: international organisations, 
developed countries, developing countries and their representatives. Section 4 
provides a case study for two classifications (the landlocked developing 
countries and the small island developing states) that would a priori appear to 
be based on purely geographical characteristics. We investigate why the 
classifications show completely different dynamics in terms of the speed and 
extend of proliferation of the countries in the classification. Section 5 deals 
with some implications for developing countries and global governance and 
proposes policy changes.     
2   An overview of  multilateral initiatives 
Starting in the 1950s several multilateral efforts, particularly within the UN 
system, have been implemented to cluster and differentiate developing 
countries according to common characteristics thought to delay or impede 
their development and economic growth. For the purpose of this inquiry, the 
selected categorisations include a total of nine different categories of 
developing countries considered within UN principal organs and agencies, and 
Bretton Woods’ institutions, specifically: 
 UN:  
o UN: Least Developed Countries (LDC)  
o UN: Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDC)  
o UN: Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 
o UNDP: the Human Development Index (LHDC and MHDC 
Human Development Countries) 
 Bretton Woods: 
o World Bank: Income level categories (LIC and LMIC) 
o World Bank + IMF: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
o World Bank (+ OECD-DAC): Fragile States (FS) 
Attached to these clusters/groups are different sets of special and differential 
treatment/benefits. Above all, country differentiation results in development-
promoting benefits being assigned, in principle, to different categories of 
developing countries. Indeed, categorisation/classification of countries gains 
particular interest in the context of policy discussions on the transfer of real 
resources from richer (developed) to poorer (developing) countries because: 
‘Where resource transfers are involved countries have an economic interest in 
these definitions and therefore the definitions are much debated’ (Nielsen, 
2011: 4). 
According to this rationale, over the years, developing countries have been 
placed in several and often overlapping categories. One consequence of the 
spaghetti and noodles bowl as depicted in Figure 1, is that it is often hard to 
understand which country gets (or is entitled to) what (and why). Table 1 
numerically illustrates the extent of this overlap. It indicates how many of the 
countries in each of the selected categories also belong to other categories. 
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There is a proliferation of categories within multilateral organisations, 
indicating a tendency to create new categories of countries whenever new 
development or economic problems are identified. 
TABLE 1 
 Matrix of selected developing countries’ categories 
 LDC LLDC LIC LMIC LHD MHD HIPC FS 
LDC 49 17 30 18 39 6 31 24 
LLDC  32 15 11 14 12 13 5 
LIC   35 0 28 3 26 16 
LMIC    57 15 31 12 13 
LHD     46 0 32 22 
MHD      47 6 5 
HIPC       39 18 
FS        36 
Source: Appendix 
The UN is the mother of four important categories. In November 1971 
the General Assembly first approved the list of what it considered ‘hardcore’5 
Least Developed Countries (LDC) and through this category donors should 
provide special treatment to these countries, in terms of aid, trade and 
technical assistance (Fialho 2012). From the initial 25 LDCs identified in 1971, 
the category grew to a total of 51 countries as more countries became 
independent in the 1970s and the poor performance of other developing 
countries made them join the group in the 1980s and 1990s. Since 1994 
membership fell to 48 LDCs following three graduation cases (Botswana 
(1994), Cape Verde (2008) and Maldives (2011)), rising again recently to 49 
countries, following the inclusion of the Republic of South Sudan, in 2012 
(UNCDP, 2012: 1). Two categorisations, apparently exclusively based on 
geographical factors and widely used, are the landlocked developing countries 
(LLDC) and the small island developing states (SIDS). We will take a closer look at 
the SIDS in Section 4 and investigate why it is difficult to come up with a 
consensus of which countries should be considered SIDS. Regarding the 
LLDCs, the application of the criteria to countries that ‘lack territorial access to 
the sea’ (UN 2011: 1), has been less problematic also due to the consensus 
view that high transportation and transit costs related to being landlocked 
hinder trade and investment and, thus, imposes economic burdens on these 
countries. This, in turn, contributes to increased poverty and adverse effects on 
development. In fact, among developing countries, LLDCs present some of 
the lowest growth rates and ‘are heavily dependent on a very limited number of 
commodities for their exports’ (G77, 2004). To assist in overcoming these 
handicaps, the Almaty Programme of Action, established in 2003, represents 
                                                 
5 UN, Resolution on Identification of the least developed among the developing countries, 1971, at 
http://www.unitar.org/resource/sites/unitar.org.resource/files/document-pdf/GA-2767-
XXVI.pdf, accessed 1 September 2010, p 52. 
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the response of the international community to address the special needs of 
LLDCs, suggesting/recommending special and differential treatment in their 
favour. A fourth category – very much inspired by the work of Mahbub ul Haq 
and Amartya Sen (see ul Haq 2003) – was launched in 1990 by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), ranking countries according to their 
human development index: (i) low (LHD), (ii) medium (MHD), (iii) high (HHD) 
and (iv) very high human development (VHHD)6. According to UNDP, this 
method ‘introduced a new way of measuring development by combining 
indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and income into a 
composite human development index, the HDI’,7 introducing a new paradigm 
in terms of framing and definition of development, at the heart of which laid 
the notion of human capabilities (Jolly et al, 2004: 179). Unlike the other 
categories, it does not exactly recommend or advocate for the special and 
differential treatment of certain countries. 
Within the Bretton Woods institutions, developing country differentiation 
has meant the creation of different groups of countries over the years. In the 
1980s, the World Bank established a categorisation based exclusively on income 
level, as measured by per capita Gross National Income (GNI), which today 
comprises: (i) low-income countries (LIC), (ii) lower-middle-income countries (LMIC) (iii) 
upper-middle-income countries (UMIC), (iv) high-income countries (HIC), and (v) high-
income OECD members.8 (For the purpose of this article the focus will be 
exclusively on the bottom two categories: which congregate the world’s 90 
poorest countries). Essentially, these are ‘analytical income categories … based 
on the Bank’s operational lending categories (civil works preferences, IDA 
eligibility, etc.)’.9  Accordingly: 
These operational guidelines were established based on the view that since 
poorer countries deserve better conditions from the Bank, comparative estimates 
of economic capacity needed to be established. GNI, a broad measure, was 
considered to be the best single indicator of economic capacity and progress; at 
the same time it was recognised that GNI does not, by itself, constitute or 
measure welfare or success in development. GNI per capita is therefore the 
Bank’s main criterion of classifying countries.10 
The heavily indebted poor country (HIPC) initiative, established in 1996, is a 
joint approach promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank, aiming at ‘ensuring that no poor country faces a debt burden it 
cannot manage’.11 The majority of HIPCs are overly indebted low-income 
countries (according to the World Bank’s income level categorisation) that can 
benefit from IMF and World Bank assistance to service and reduce their debt, 
ideally bringing it to a sustainable level. The HIPC initiative is  
                                                 
6 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 
7 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hdi/ 
8 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-
groups 
9 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/a-short-history 
10 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/a-short-history 
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open to the world’s poorest countries … that: (i) are eligible only for highly 
concessional assistance such as from the World Bank’s International 
Development Association (IDA) and the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility …; (ii) face an unsustainable debt situation …; and (iii) have a proven 
track record in implementing strategies focused on reducing poverty and building  
the foundation for sustainable economic growth.12 
By the start of 2013, 39 such countries13 (most of them in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
see Appendix table A1) have been found eligible to receive special treatment 
(more specifically, debt relief) under the HIPC initiative. 
Finally, another category of countries - this one still evolving towards a 
clearer definition - is the fragile states group,14 which replaced the World Bank’s 
concept of low-income countries under stress (LICUS).15  State fragility is a 
categorising concept applied by the World Bank and the OECD-DAC. Both 
organisations define this concept by referring to ‘low income and to the World 
Bank CPIA16  rating, and they differ only by the CPIA threshold’ (Guillaumont, 
2009: 14). More specifically, fragile states are  
defined as having either: a) a composite World Bank, African Development Bank 
and Asian Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
rating of 3.2 or less; or b) the presence of a United Nations and/or regional 
peace-keeping or peace-building mission ..., with the exclusion of border 
monitoring operations, during the past three years.17  
                                                                                                                            
11 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm 
12 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/ 
0,,contentMDK:20259564~pagePK:64166689~piPK:64166646~theSitePK:469043,00
.html#04   
13 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm and 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,
contentMDK:20260049~menuPK:64166739~pagePK:64166689~piPK:64166646~th
eSitePK:469043,00.html 
14 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-
1269623894864/FCSHarmonisedListFY13.pdf 
15 Two criteria defined LICUS (considered to be countries with weak policies, 
institutions and governance): per capita income within IDA threshold and 
performance of 3.0 or less on both the overall Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) rating and the CPIA rating for Public Sector Management and 
Institutions. Depending on these criteria, a LICUS country was classified in one of 
three subgroups: severe, core, or marginal. Marginal LICUS scored on the edge of 
what was considered LICUS and were identified only for monitoring purposes 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/licus06_map.html) 
16 The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rates countries according 
to sixteen criteria, grouped in four clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural 
policies; (iii) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (iv) public sector management 
and institutions (www.worldbank.org). 
17 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/ 
EXTLICUS/0,,menuPK:511784~pagePK:64171540~piPK:64171528~theSitePK:511
778,00.html 
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In addition, ‘[c]ountries are considered core fragile states if their CPIA is 
below 3.0 ... [and] marginal fragile states if their CPIA score is between 3.0 and 
3.2’.18 These are countries that ‘face severe development challenges such as 
insecurity, weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic 
humanitarian crises, persistent social tensions, violence or the legacy of civil 
war’.19 Among the 36 countries categorised as fragile states20 by the start of 
2013, the World Bank differentiates between four situations: (i) post-conflict 
countries, (ii) re-engaging and turnaround countries, (iii) deteriorating 
situations, and (iv) prolonged impasse.21 
Typically the purpose of the differentiation is to provide some countries 
with a specific special and differential treatment and others not. Table 2 
summarises the special and differential treatment entailed by each one of these 
categories. As observed before, countries are often in more than one category 
and then allocated the benefits allotted to all the categories they are included 
in. To return to an earlier example: Afghanistan is entitled to the benefits and 
differential treatment for LDCs and can also apply for the windows for Fragile 
States, HIPCs, LLDCs and LICs.22 
3   Why does the proliferation occur? 
So what drives the proliferation of categories? Why has the international 
provision of preferential treatment to developing countries become so 
complex and non-transparent? Differentiating among developing countries 
tends to be a rather political process, even if hidden in technicalities. A clear 
evidence of that is the impasse that, for years, has blocked international 
agreement on the creation of a consensual category of small islands developing 
states; a category that, given its distinct geographical characteristic, should, in 
theory, be one of the less problematic to establish. After all, to any lay person, 
an island is simply a piece of land surrounded by water. Yet, can, for example, 
Timor-Leste and Haiti be considered islands even though they share that piece 
of land surrounded by water with Indonesia and the Dominican Republic, 
respectively? On the other hand, what exactly constitutes small and developing? 
Who determines the frontiers of all these concepts and definitions, particularly 
in a context where, ultimately, there is (at least in principle) a pot of gold at the 
end of the rainbow (i.e., privileged access to special and differential treatment)? 
                                                 
18 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/ 
EXTLICUS/0,,contentMDK:22310165~menuPK:6432437~pagePK:64171531~piPK
:64171507~theSitePK:511778,00.html  
19 http://www.oecd.org/dacfragilestates/ 
20 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-
1269623894864/FCSHarmonisedListFY13.pdf 
21 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/ 
EXTLICUS/0,,contentMDK:22310165~menuPK:6432437~pagePK:64171531~piPK
:64171507~theSitePK:511778,00.html 
22 Afghanistan is also a Low Human Development Country, but this does not give rise 
to benefits in terms of differential treatment. 
13 
 
TABLE 2 
 General overview of selected developing countries categories  
and their respective benefits 
Categories Benefits/Special and differential treatment 
LDC ODA: bilateral donors’ commitment to allocate 0.15% of GNP as ODA to LDCs (ac-
cording to the Brussels Declaration and Programme of Action) 
Several UN organisations target technical cooperation programmes to LDCs or 
earmark a proportion of their budgets for LDCs 
Preferential market access: Generalised System of Preferences (GSP - non-
reciprocal) and Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP - among developing 
countries, is a reciprocal scheme available for signatories) 
Special treatment regarding WTO obligations (for LDCs that are WTO member 
states) and WTO accession 
Trade-related capacity building: through the Integrated Framework for Trade-related 
technical assistance to LDCs; a multi-agency, multi-donor programme to assist 
LDCs in developing trade-related capacities 
Financial support: provided by the UN (and its organisations) for the participation of 
LDC representatives in annual sessions of the General Assembly and in other UN 
meetings 
Entitlement to 90% discount in LDC contributions to UN peacekeeping operations 
LDC contributions to the UN regular budget are capped at 0.01% of the total UN 
budget 
LLDC Almaty Programme of Action: establishes general guidelines/recommendations for 
the special and differential treatment of LLDCs in the areas of transit policy, infra-
structure development, international trade and ODA 
EU-ACP Agreement: previews special treatment for ACP countries that are LLDCs 
Debt relief under HIPC initiative: previewed for LLDCs that are also HIPC 
SIDS World Bank’s small island exception: provision of IDA resources to small islands 
whose per capita income is above the IDA eligibility cut-off but have no or very lim-
ited creditworthiness, which impedes their access to IBRD borrowing 
EU-ACP Agreement: previews special treatment for ACP countries that are also 
SIDS 
LIC Access to the World Bank’s IDA concessional lending 
Several bilateral donors use the LIC classification to determine ODA allocation 
Regional and multilateral financial institutions often allocate concessionary financing 
to developing countries based on the LIC classification 
LMIC Some are considered blend countries and are eligible for both IDA concessional 
loans (due to their low per capita incomes) and non-concessional IBRD loans (be-
cause they are financially creditworthy) 
HIPC Debt relief under the HIPC mechanism 
FS Based on the OECD-DAC Principles of Good International Engagement with Fragile 
States,23 the World Bank takes a differentiated approach to fragile states by adapt-
ing its interventions to specific challenges faced by these countries 
Source: Compilation based on UN (2003, 2006), UNDESA (2004), OECD-DAC  
(http://www.oecd.org/dacfragilestates/) 
                                                 
23 Provides ‘a set of guidelines for actors involved in development co-operation, 
peacebuilding, statebuilding and security in fragile and conflict-affected states … 
These principles were established because fragile states require different responses 
than those applied in better performing countries’. 
http://www.oecd.org/dacfragilestates/  
23 Afghanistan is also a Low Human Development Country, but this does not give rise 
to benefits in terms of differential treatment.  
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In effect, 
Existing taxonomies suffer from lack of clarity with regard to how they 
distinguish among country groupings. The World Bank does not explain why the 
threshold between developed and developing countries is a per capita income 
level of US$6,000 in 1987-prices and the UNDP does not provide any rationale 
for why the ratio of developed and developing countries is one to three. As for 
the IMF’s classification system, it is not clear what threshold is used (Nielsen, 
2011: 41). 
Nielsen (2011: 10) mentions that, for example, in 1960, at the time of the 
establishment of the World Bank’s concessional financing entity (the 
International Development Association – IDA), the differentiation between 
donors and beneficiaries ‘was a political exercise: a civilized understanding 
among sovereign countries about how to label each other’. 
In order to understand the process of proliferation it is important to 
consider what is in it for the main players: the international organisations, the 
developed countries and the developing countries. Complicating the analysis is 
that it is actually not these nations and institutions, but rather their 
representatives (bureaucrats, diplomats, etc.) that bear the costs and benefits of 
proliferation.  Therefore we will consider the representatives analytically as a 
fourth group of players. This approach builds on both longstanding and recent 
contributions from different perspectives on international economic 
relationships.  
3.1 International organisations 
It is important to realize at the start that differentiation of countries and 
classifications often are meant to serve a useful purpose. In general, for these 
organisations, these categories of developing countries work primarily (but not 
exclusively) as internal policy instruments. Firstly, classifications are used by 
the international organisations in order to increase their efficiency in 
policymaking and policy implementation. This is to be achieved by 
customisation of policy-prescriptions according to particular development 
issues/conditions (e.g., landlockness, indebtedness, islandness, fragility, etc.) 
and helped by in-depth knowledge of and specialisation in development issues 
faced by different groups of developing countries.24 New problems create new 
tasks and in a number of cases that requires new instruments and may thus 
lead to new categorisations. Examples are the World Bank that systematises 
different income categories to facilitate its loan/grant allocation and the 
IMF/World Bank that institutionalised the HIPC initiative to assist the 
implementation of their debt relief programmes. Secondly, categories may 
provide valuable communication tools. UNDP, for example, created the 
human development ranking to help it advocate a more comprehensive type of 
development that went beyond per capita production. Yet another example is 
                                                 
24 Of course the benefits of less costly group policymaking have to be balanced against 
the potential loss in individual/country-specific policymaking and assessment. 
15 
 
that the World Bank (and the OECD-DAC) define(s) fragile states to create 
awareness of policymakers when considering development prescriptions for 
these countries. Thirdly, categorisations may be a gateway to increased donor 
attention and funding (both by the public sector, by NGOs and by commercial 
parties). An example is the HIPC initiative that was complemented by the 
Inter-American Development Bank and where the IMF and World Bank 
reportedly use moral suasion to ensure voluntary creditor participation in the 
initiative.25 It can be argued that the creation of a category may reflect an effort 
to normalise/depoliticise development support with the aim of stimulating a 
needs-based/recipient-focused type of assistance allocation, rather than an 
approach that is mostly responsive to donors’ self-interests and/or 
motivations. A category can be helpful in advocating the prioritisation of 
assistance to certain countries and subjecting international organisations and 
donor countries to closer scrutiny in terms of international 
pledges/commitments made towards specific groups of developing countries. 
The LDC category is a clear example and its purpose is more sensitive than 
that sought by the other similar multilateral initiatives, because it pierces the 
realm of countries’ sovereign decision on how to allocate development support 
measures.  
However, the proliferation of categories may also be a reflection of 
wasteful competition between and within international organisations. Frey 
(2008; 338) observes that lower entry costs induce larger numbers of 
international organisations that provide the same or similar services and 
concludes that: “International organizations have an incentive to suppress 
competition by dividing up the field of activity according to regions and 
specific sub-types of activity” (Frey 2008: 339). Moreover, bureaucracies try to 
maximize their independence and one way to do this is by using discretionary 
rather than rule-based approaches (Vaubel 1996). Many of the categories 
reflect an ever increasing discretionary approach that undercuts or modifies 
criteria. Examples are the LDC category for which the criteria have been 
revised several times in order to ‘prevent’ countries from graduating and the 
World Bank’s further differentiation of fragile states into four subcategories 
that illustrates both the practical difficulties of the umbrella ‘fragile states’ as 
well as the ever continuing quest for further categorisation.  
At yet another level, the proliferation of overlapping categories can also be 
seen as a reflection of self-interested actors maximizing the likelihood of the 
organisation’s (and therefore their own) survival amongst others by increasing 
its depth and scope (Schneider and Tobin 2011). The spaghetti bowl may thus 
reflect continued existence and decision-making power of certain bureaucratic 
structures that over the years: (i) have been purposely created just to manage 
these categories and, consequently, have gained in-depth knowledge of the 
development hurdles faced by these countries; and (ii) have based their 
mandates on diagnosing development/economic problems faced by these 
specific groups of countries and prescribing interventions for them. Indeed, it 
is not far-fetched for bureaucracies to consider their own survival ahead of any 
                                                 
25 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm 
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idealistic goal. In this line, the continued existence of the bureaucratic 
apparatus - and not the best interest of member states and their citizens - tends 
to become the primary unstated goal of the organisation. The principal-agent 
theory explains this distortion, postulating that International Organisations 
have ‘vested interests which differ from the preferences of the voters and the 
voters cannot effectively control the international organization because they 
are rationally ignorant of most of its activities and/or lack the power to impose 
their will’ (Vaudel, 2006: 126-127). 
Additionally, evidence has shown that an  
elementary feature of bureaucracies is that they classify and organize information 
and knowledge. This classification process is bound up with power ... The ability 
to classify objects, to shift their very definition and identity, is one of 
bureaucracy’s greatest sources of power ... Categorization and classification are a 
ubiquitous feature of bureaucratization that has potentially important 
implications for those being classified. To classify is to engage in an act of power 
(Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 710-711). 
3.2 Developed countries 
It is by now a well-established stylized fact that the developed economies use 
development assistance as a tool to foster their own political and economic 
interests. The impact of geopolitical interests on developmental relationships 
has been studies at all levels of international development cooperation and 
been established for the UN, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank 
and in bilateral development assistance (see for example: Kilby 2006, Boschini 
and Olofsgård 2007 and Dreher et al. 2009). Ultimately, international 
organisations are extensions (and, hence, serve the interests and values) of their 
most powerful member states (Abbott and Snidal 1998, Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999, Köchler 2006, Drezner 2009). Therefore, it is not uncommon 
for them to sponsor reforms and policies aimed, ultimately, at replicating 
values supported by the powerful onto less powerful societies (Tabb 2004). In 
this sense, the proliferation of these categories might very well serve as a 
conveyor belt for the widespread diffusion of Western-inspired 
reforms/interests through the provision of special and differential treatment 
that promotes certain Western-friendly development/economic practices. 
Likewise, the complexity resulting from this proliferation also works in the 
same direction. There are, indeed, ‘powerful reasons to believe that regime 
complexity will enhance rather than limit the great powers’ (Drezner, 2009: 68). 
Developed countries have an important role to play in curbing the tendency of 
international bureaucrats to further complicate the country differentiation 
landscape. After all, more differentiation means more committees, more 
meetings, more travel, more time and thus more costs that often have to be 
covered by developed countries. Indeed, the checks against bureaucratic waste 
have to come from the major principals (the dominant countries or the major 
contributors). By implication, lower voting power of the major principals may 
reduce the incentives and possibilities to provide that check and thereby 
increase bureaucratic inefficiency (Vaubel 1996: 209). Sometimes the mandate 
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(that is, the delegation by the principals) may play havoc. Gutner (2012: 350-
352) points out that the delegation of conflicting tasks (so-called antinomic 
delegation) will stimulate mission creep, that is: the growth of tasks, goals and 
often the mandate beyond levels that were originally envisaged. Blurring 
development and other goals (environment, peace-keeping, etc.) may thus 
stimulate bureaucratic proliferation processes. 
3.3 Developing countries 
In the past the major motive for developing countries to push for new 
categories would seem to consist of the efficiency and efficacy of lobbying due 
to greater ease of coordination with like-minded countries in order to better 
advance interests and/or claim benefits. (Or to put it more positively: a 
category creates an international setting where countries can learn about each 
other’s shared interests and shared concerns). The existence of specific 
instances could then help to directly claim special and differential treatment. 
The growing economic strength of developing countries since the 1990s 
adds other motivations. The sea change in their economic conditions over the 
past decade may provide a check to geopolitics and bureaucratic pathologies 
(see Humphrey and Michaelowa 2013 for the case of multilateral lending).  
Moreover, developing countries have become more self-confident and want to 
play a role in the system (Elsig 2011). It is completely rational that politicians 
and delegates from smaller countries may prefer to participate in (committees 
of) international organisations where they can exert influence rather than in 
those that are dominated by the world powers (Frey 2008: 340-1). Of course it 
is also possible that developing countries might seek this proliferation of 
categories lured by the possibility of having specific instances where to more 
directly claim preferential treatment. This takes into account the fact that one 
of the categories referred to earlier (small islands) is an initiative strongly 
backed by developing countries themselves. 
3.4 Representatives 
The management of country lists is an important activity of the bureaucrats 
employed by the international organisations. These tasks involve all aspects of 
their authority: rule-making, definition and creation of categories and the 
discourse in ‘their’ policy arena, creation and reshaping of incentives and/or 
interests and (political) organisation (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). 
Indeed, the bureaucrats propose lists of countries to be offered differential 
treatment, determine the countries to be actually included on those lists and 
negotiate the benefits of differential treatment. In this regard, Haftel and 
Thompson (2006: 261) mention that ‘some secretariats and commissions can 
initiate and recommend policies and thereby promote the goals of the 
organization, prerogatives that greatly enhance bureaucratic authority’. 
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Elsig (2010) distinguishes between the sovereign principals and the 
proximate principals that are the diplomats that work in the delegations of the 
contracting parties.26 These diplomats do not only serve as negotiators, liaisons 
and translators of the social interests of their home country, but also have 
private interests. In particular, they will seek activities that give them visibility, 
legitimize their stay at the international organisation and further their career in 
general. Frey (2008: 339) identifies the same self-serving behaviour on the part 
of politicians and International Organisations’ employees, and states that this is 
‘not necessarily made in bad faith. Persons already engaged in a particular 
international field are often convinced that they are the most knowledgeable 
and thus the most valuable actors’. Nonetheless, he also recognises the 
discretionary power of International Organisations, ‘which bureaucracy tends 
to use for its own advantage’ (Frey, 2008: 341). 
4   Case Study: landlocked developing countries (LLDC) 
versus small island developing states (SIDS) 
Our case study focuses on two classifications that would a priori appear to be 
based on purely geographical grounds but show different dynamics in terms of 
proliferation. 
4.1 Observations 
While the categorisation of LLDCs has been relatively straightforward and 
unambiguous,27 the main difficulty with also including SIDS in Tables 1 and A1 
is the fact that, unlike LLDCs and all the other categories referred to earlier, 
‘there is no clear definition for what constitutes an island-nation’ (Schmidt, 
2005: A 607). This has generated much confusion. According to Carolina 
(2013: 4)  
The existence of the “Small Island Development States” (the SIDS) was 
recognized in 1992 by the United Nations (the U.N.) and this group was defined 
as “low-lying coastal countries that share similar sustainable development 
challenges, including population, limited resources, susceptibility to natural 
disasters, vulnerability to external shocks, and extensive dependence on 
international trade.” There exist an inconsistency between the definition of the 
SIDS and its acronym. As a consequence, non-islands economies as Belize, 
Suriname and Guyana, are awkwardly classified under the SIDS. 
The category of LLDCS, by contrast, has been rather uncontroversial and 
the list of such countries consensually well-defined. Also, the growth and 
development challenges that these countries face has been recognized by the 
UN for many years. There is indeed record of such recognition as early as 1957 
                                                 
26 Elsig studied the WTO, but his analysis is also relevant for other international 
organisations. 
27 Considering that it is, after all, a geographical condition and, hence, countries are 
either landlocked or not. 
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in a UN General Assembly resolution calling for the ‘full recognition to the 
needs of land-locked Member States in the matter of transit and trade and ... to 
accord them adequate facilities in terms of international law and practice’ (UN, 
1957: 13). To our knowledge, the only glimpse of a potential dispute with 
regard to the definition of the LLDC list is a reference found at UNCTAD’s 
website, mentioning that the list is ‘informally accepted by UN member States’ 
(emphasis added).28 More importantly, the list has been stable from the start.29 
In contrast, despite much international debate on SIDS over many years, 
there has been no consensus regarding this category of countries. In fact, there 
is report of the issue of islandness (and the development-hampering conditions 
it entails) being discussed in international fora as early as 40 years ago: 
The third session of UNCTAD, in 1972, decided that a panel of experts should 
identify and study the problems of island developing countries. UNCTAD IV, in 
1976, encouraged the international community to envisage special measures in 
favour of these countries. In 1977, the UNCTAD secretariat established a Special 
Programme for Least Developed Countries, and Land-locked and Island 
Developing Countries, the first such institutional unit within the United Nations 
... The main characteristics and problems of island developing countries were 
discussed in UNCTAD reports and raised in United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions, at regular intervals, between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s. ... The 
notion of “island developing countries” was abandoned by the United Nations in 
1994, and gave way to a more focused denomination, that of small island 
developing States (SIDS) (Hein, 2004: 4-5) 
So, according to Hein (2004: 8), ‘it was only in 1994 that it became 
politically possible to exclude larger States from the range of island developing 
countries that were deemed in need of special attention’. However, to this day, 
this has still not been achieved. Actually, big islands (and non-islands) are still 
part of many different lists of SIDS. 
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) – an ad hoc lobbying and 
negotiating group30 that represents the interests of SIDS within the UN system 
– has a membership of 44 countries and territories (including non-self-
governing islands). It is important to note that ‘AOSIS members include 
Belize, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, and Suriname, which are all coastal – although 
not technically island – nations’ (Schmidt, 2005: A 607). In addition, Cuba, 
with a population of 11.3 million, is also a member of AOSIS (Schmidt, 2005: 
A 607). While, contrary to the examples of Belize, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana and 
Suriname, Cuba is undoubtedly an island, with a population of more than 11 
million people it can hardly be considered a small one. 
In addition to the AOSIS list of SIDS, which Encontre (2004) considers 
to be an essentially political list; there is also reference to an economic list of 
SIDS, an institutional list of SIDS, and the UNCTAD non-official list of SIDS. 
                                                 
28http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Landlocked%20Developing%20Countries/Lis
t-of-land-locked-developing-countries.aspx 
29 To our knowledge, the creation and consequent inclusion of South Sudan in this list 
2011 is the only noteworthy change. 
30 Created in 1990 at the 2nd World Climate Conference. 
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In fact, a quick investigation reveals at least six different lists of SIDS (Table 3); 
ranging from 13 to 52 such countries by the start of 2013. These also include 
different lists of SIDS being considered within one single organisation: the 
UN; denoting proliferation within one single category and, most possibly, 
existence of organisational feuds/disputes. 
TABLE 3 
 Six different lists of SIDS 
 World Bank’s 
small island 
exception 
(13)31 
UNCTAD’s 
unofficial list 
of SIDS (29) 
UNDESA’s 
(SIDSnet) list 
of SIDS (39) 
AOSIS’ 
members and 
observers 
(44) 
UNESCO’s 
list of SIDS 
(45) 
UN-OHRLLS’ 
list of SIDS 
(52) 
Since: 1985 1994 (?) 1997 1991 2008 2001 
American Samoa    X (observer) X 
Anguilla      X 
Antigua and 
Barbuda  X X X X X 
Aruba     
X  
(associate 
member) 
X 
Bahamas  X X X X X 
Barbados  X X X X X 
Bahrain     X  
Belize   X X X X 
British Virgin Is.     
X  
(associate 
member) 
X 
Cape Verde X X X X X X 
Commonwealth 
of Northern 
Marianas 
     X 
Comoros  X X X X X 
Cook Is.   X X X X 
Cuba   X X X X 
Curuçao     
X  
(associate 
member) 
 
Dominica X X X X X X 
Dominican Rep.   X X X X 
Fiji  X X X X X 
French Polynesia      X 
Guam    X (observer) X 
Guinea-Bissau   X X X X 
Grenada X X X X X X 
Guyana   X X X X 
Haiti   X X X X 
Jamaica  X X X X X 
Kiribati X X X X X X 
Maldives X X X X X X 
Marshall Is. X X X X X X 
Mauritius  X X X X X 
                                                 
31 This list is periodically reviewed. The list on this table reflects the one considered in 
the October 2012 IDA16 Mod-term Review. 
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Micronesia X X X X X X 
Montserrat      X 
Nauru  X X X X X 
Netherlands 
Antilles    X (observer) X 
New Caledonia      X 
Niue   X. X X X 
Northern Mariana 
Is.      X 
Palau  X X X X X 
Papua New 
Guinea  X X X X X 
Puerto Rico    X  X 
Sint Maarten     
X 
(associate 
member) 
 
St. Kitts and Nevis  X X X X X 
St. Lucia X X X X X X 
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines X X X X X X 
Samoa X X X X X X 
S. Tomé and 
Príncipe  X X X X X 
Seychelles  X X X X X 
Singapore   X X X X 
Solomon Is.  X X X X X 
Suriname   X X X X 
Timor-Leste  X X X X X 
Tokelau     
X  
(associate 
member) 
 
Tonga X X X X X X 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  X X X X X 
Tuvalu X X X X X X 
US Virgin Is.    X (observer) X 
Vanuatu X X X X X X 
Note: Non-independent territories/Non-UN members are in italics. 
Source: Compilation based on Encontre (2004), UNDESA (http://www.sidsnet.org/country-profiles), AOSIS 
(http://aosis.info/members-and-observers/), UN Office of the High Representative for the LDC, LLDC and SIDS 
(UN-OHRLLS)(http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/UN_SIDS_booklet_5x6-5_062811_web.pdf), World Bank 
(http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/10/24/000333038_201210242
32535/Rendered/PDF/733630BR0IDA0R0Official0Use0Only090.pdf), UNESCO 
(http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/priority-areas/sids/about-unesco-and-sids/sids-list/), accessed 5 
May 2013. 
The more inclusive of these SIDS lists is the one advocated by the UN-
Office of the High Representative for LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS (UN-
OHRLLS), with 52 countries, including indisputably not-so-small islands and 
non-independent territories. The World Bank’s list of SIDS is the less 
inclusive, while UNCTAD ‘unofficial’ list of SIDS excludes non-independent 
territories as well as bigger islands and coastal/continental countries considered 
by the UN-OHRLLS, UNDESA, UNESCO and AOSIS. 
Additionally, in the analytical categorisation used in the 2012 LDC Report, 
UNCTAD differentiates island LDCs from other LDCs, grouping together 
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eight African, Asian and Pacific island LDCs,32 while leaving out Haiti and 
Madagascar because both are regarded as large islands (UNCTAD, 2012: xii). 
This exclusion is consistent with UNCTAD’s unofficial list of SIDS. However, 
strangely enough, in the Report, Haiti, a Caribbean island, ends up grouped 
together with African LDCs, revealing a considerable degree of discretion and 
randomness in the framing of the analysis and thus in perceived and reported 
needs of island economies. 
Paradoxically, the inability to reach consensus (or informal agreement) on 
a single internationally-(or even UN)-agreed list of SIDS has not stopped the 
multiplication of SIDS-specific bureaucratic structures within the UN. These 
are aimed, essentially, at managing these lists. In effect, besides the Special 
Programme for LDCs, LLDCs and Island Developing Countries established at 
UNCTAD in 1977, AOSIS established in 1991 and the UNESCO SIDS 
Platform established in 2008, 
A High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Land-locked 
Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States was appointed in 
2001, and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs has maintained a 
Small Island Developing States Unit (Hein, 2004: 8-9). 
Oddly enough, despite the existence of a myriad of bureaucratic structures 
devoted to SIDS (and the additional fixed costs they entail), the UN has not 
been able to agree on SIDS-specific special and differential treatment to be 
unanimously advocated among its main funds and agencies, let alone among its 
member states. Ironically, apart from the World Bank’s small island exception33 
and the EU-ACP Agreement34 (which envisages special treatment for ACP 
countries that are SIDS), not much has been done within the UN to convert 
‘the recognition of SIDS-specific issues into (…) SIDS-specific concessions’ 
(Encontre, 2004: 92). Thus, besides the World Bank’s and the EU’s support 
instruments, SIDS have been supported essentially through ‘North-South 
arrangements such as those maintained by the European Union to benefit ACP 
countries, or by the United States in favour of specific regions involving island 
States (e.g. through the Caribbean Basin Initiative)’ (Encontre, 2004: 92). 
To sum it up, the UN has reproduced (i.e., has stimulated the proliferation 
of) bureaucratic structures dealing with SIDS (or at least has not impeded it), 
with little practical results in terms of: (i) reaching a consensual definition of 
SIDS and (ii) designing concrete special and differential treatment in their 
favour. In fact, some argue that politics has impeded agreement on an 
                                                 
32 Comoros, Kiribati, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
33 This exception, in effect since 1985, reflects the recognition, by the World Bank, 
that SIDS typically have to deal with higher transportation costs, fewer opportunities 
to pursue economies of scale and severe human capital constraints because of their 
small size and small populations. Thus, the small island economy exception permits 
the provision of IDA resources to small island economies, with per capita income 
above the operational cut-off for IDA eligibility. 
34 Allows the implementation of specific measures benefiting landlocked and island 
ACP countries. 
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unequivocal definition of SIDS and the lack of an internationally agreed 
‘definition of the SIDS category has been the most fundamental reason for 
which countries that claimed to fall in that category were not able to gain 
special treatment on grounds of “small islandness”’ (Encontre, 2004: 92). 
Table 4 highlights the main differences between the LLDC and the SIDS 
categories.   
TABLE 4 
 Comparing LLDC and SIDS: bringing out the facts 
 Landlocked developing 
countries (LLDC) 
Small island developing states (SIDS) 
First discussed 1957 1972 
Acceptance informal no 
Consensus yes no 
Initiative  UN UN and developing countries 
Number of lists 1 at least 6 
Number of countries 32 ranging from 13 to 52 
Number of countries not meeting 
the technical requirements 
0 19 
(These are either non-independent territories 
or coastal/non-island countries included in the 
six different SIDS lists considered. This 
number goes up if smallness (or lack thereof) 
is also taken into consideration) 
Main policy documents Almaty Programme of Action 
(2003) 
Almaty Declaration (2003) 
Roadmap for the implementation 
of the Almaty Programme of 
Action (2004) 
Barbados Programme of Action/Programme of 
Action for the Sustainable Development of 
SIDS (1994) 
Mauritius Strategy for the further 
implementation of the Programme of Action for 
the Sustainable Development of SIDS (2005) 
 Mauritius Declaration (2005) 
Bureaucratic 
apparatus/Organizational 
structures 
UN Office of the High 
Representative for the LDC, LLDC 
and SIDS 
UNCTAD’s Special Programme for 
LDCs, LLDCs and Island 
Developing Countries 
UN Office of the High Representative for the 
LDC, LLDC and SIDS 
UNCTAD’s Special Programme for LDCs, 
LLDCs and Island Developing Countries 
UNDESA’s SIDS Unit 
UNESCO’s SIDS Platform/Section for Small 
Islands and Indigenous Knowledge 
AOSIS (no budget, nor secretariat; operates 
out of chairman’s Mission to the UN) 
Benefits/Special 
treatment/Support measures 
EU-ACP Agreement: previews 
special treatment for ACP 
countries that are LLDCs 
Debt relief under HIPC initiative: 
previewed for LLDCs that are also 
HIPC 
World Bank’s small island exception: IDA 
resources to small islands whose per capita 
income is above the IDA eligibility cut-off but 
have no (or very limited) creditworthiness, 
which impedes access to IBRD borrowing 
EU-ACP Agreement: previews special 
treatment for ACP countries that are also SIDS 
US Caribbean Basin Initiative provides duty-
free access to the US market for most goods 
from 17 SIDS35  in the region 
Source: Compilation based on UN (1957), Hein (2004), www.aosis.org, 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/priority-areas/sids/about-unesco-and-
sids/unesco-sids-platform/http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade 
development/preference-programs/caribbean-basin-initiative-cbi (accessed May 3, 2013). 
                                                 
35 Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin 
Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Panama, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago. 
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4.2 Preliminary conclusions 
The key characteristics of this case study are as follows: contrary to the LLDC 
example, there has been (i) much debate on SIDS for many years, (ii) no 
consensual list of SIDS defined, (iii) many SIDS-specific bureaucratic 
structures created within the UN, (iv) special and differential treatment in 
favour of SIDS only coming from other organisations (e.g., World Bank and 
EU). 
If we take the LLDC category as a benchmark, these observations indicate 
unproductive fragmentation of efforts and uncoordinated activities, denoting 
wasteful competition between and within organisations. This finding may have 
broader implications. For example the same sort of wasteful institutional 
fragmentation has been observed with respect to development assistance. For 
example in the case of the United States’ ‘more than 50 different bureaucratic 
units with overlapping responsibilities involved in giving foreign assistance’, 
Frey (2008: 340) concludes that ‘negative externalities produced by the efforts 
to help, as well as the large fixed set-up costs may well produce poorer results’. 
That conclusion also could be relevant for the many SIDS lists. 
Looking specifically at the size of the six different lists of SIDS considered 
in this chapter, one important explanation for the considerably smaller World 
Bank category is that the five different SIDS lists at the UN have been created 
in a situation of conflicting tasks related to (i) development (UNCTAD, 
UNDESA, UNOHRLLS), (ii) environment (AOSIS), and (iii) 
education/science/culture (UNESCO), giving rise to mission creep; while the 
World Bank small islands exemption is straight forwardly related to only one 
aspect, that is: development finance. 
Yet, looking beyond list size, what is it about SIDS that has generated all 
this bureaucratic activity around the category, but little practical results? Who 
gains from this impasse and confusing state of affairs? What is in it for 
International Organisations, developed countries, developing countries and 
their representatives? 
Clearly, International Organisations and representatives (namely, 
bureaucrats employed by International Organisations and 
diplomats/representatives from both developed and developing countries) gain 
quite a lot. While the fuss goes on, it is not surprising that they are indeed able 
to safeguard vested interests by maintaining and securing jobs, networking 
possibilities, and consultancy opportunities. Until a clear definition is reached, 
the lists proliferate, as demonstrated, and there continues to be reason for 
more international debate, more studies, more counter-studies, more meetings, 
more expert advice, more travel and, ultimately, more costs (often borne by 
developed countries). The proliferation of different SIDS lists within one 
single organisation can, in fact, be a (i) reflection of self-interested actors 
maximizing the likelihood of particular departments’ (and their own) survival 
and (ii) a concrete indication that bureaucratic motives are driving the process. 
The inability of developing countries to effectively plan, decide and 
monitor their participation in these different SIDS categories illustrates a lag 
between the interests of (i) developed countries, OIs and bureaucrats and those 
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of (ii) poorer/weaker countries or in the same vain between truly vulnerable 
SIDSs and countries that for other reasons may want to be in this category. It 
is indeed quite telling that the only example of a category of countries whose 
emergence was strongly motivated by developing countries themselves (i.e., 
SIDS), in sort of a bottom-up dynamics, has not been able to gain consensual 
recognition, despite having given rise to so many bureaucratic tentacles. 
Additionally, fuelling an ever-more complex and endless SIDS 
differentiation exercise might also be in the interest of developed countries not 
so interested in according more special and differential treatment to yet 
another category of developing countries considered to be dealing with yet 
another “special situation”. Hein (2004: 12) states that 
Skepticism remains about the legitimacy of SIDS as a category requiring special 
attention, and there has been reluctance in providing these countries with 
concrete forms of special treatment, although this is generally not said openly in 
international fora dealing with these questions. 
Hence, supporting a complex situation (i.e., adding more spaghetti and 
noodles to the bowl), or not making a definite effort to clarify a confusing state 
of affairs (and agree on a single list of SIDS), can work as a tool to foster the 
interests of those in power positions, in detriment of smaller and weaker states. 
Hein’s (2004: 13) qualification of  ‘a politely supportive, yet almost dismissive 
attitude’ would seem to be on the spot. 
5  How to deal with complexity? 
We consider the spaghetti and noodles bowl to be detrimental to development 
and global governance. Firstly, the complexification of allocation/provision of 
special and differential treatment to developing countries makes it more 
difficult and costly to reap the benefits of special treatment since the 
proliferation brands more countries eligible for special treatment. This makes 
the treatment by definition less special (that is: more common and widespread) 
and thereby less valuable. Secondly, in the spaghetti and noodles bowl of too 
many overlapping categories of developing countries, specific development 
problems and/or countries can easily be overlooked. Thirdly, a developing 
country might be compelled to accept the implementation of a one-size-fits-all 
policy that is being proposed for one of the categories in which it has been 
placed (even if this would not be consistent with the policies for other 
classifications). Fourthly, a classification may provide a misleading assurance of 
easier access to special and differential treatment inducing costly lobbying 
activities. Finally, the intention of country classifications is to provide analytical 
clarity and rules that govern special treatment, but as observed by Drezner 
(2009: 67): ‘Paradoxically, after a certain point institutional and legal 
proliferation can shift global governance structures from a Lockean world of 
binding rules to a Hobbesian world of plastic rules’. Other authors have 
challenged the need for the proliferation of categories on other grounds. Payne 
(2005: 40), for example, advocates for a new critical political economy of 
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development that ‘rejects the “exceptionalism” of a special category of 
countries deemed to be in particular need of development and endeavours 
[and] … recast[s] the whole question of development as a universal question, a 
“transnational problematic”’. In line with this view, Hettne (1995: 263) defines 
development as ‘societal problem solving … [implying that] a society develops 
as it succeeds in dealing with predicaments of a structural nature, many of 
them emerging from the global context’. So, the burden of development 
should be placed on all, and not on specific groups of countries, making it ‘a 
global and universal problem’ (Hettne, 1995: 266), rather than a problem for 
selected groups of countries. 
Rather than creating predictability, rationality and transparency about rules 
and principles and protecting states against the vagaries of large countries, the 
proliferation of classifications injects the global governance system with 
discretion, enabling the exercise of power over smaller and weaker states. 
In light of all this and of the preceding analysis, the question that imposes 
itself and that will help to move this debate further; from observation and 
diagnosis of the situation to providing some direction to policymakers, is: How 
to make developing country differentiation less complex and, consequently, 
more efficient (or at least less imperfect)? Even though there is merit in 
Payne’s call for a new critical political economy of development that discards 
the exceptionalism of special categories of countries deemed to be in need of 
certain development interventions (Payne, 2005: 40), it is not realistic to think 
that such an overhauling change in the current system of developing country 
differentiation would be immediately possible. Given the misalignment of 
interests discussed in the preceding analysis, changes in the current framework 
of developing country differentiation should be deep but gradual, so that they 
can be truly meaningful and long-lasting.  
Hence, one needs to be pragmatic and accept the fact that these changes 
will have to be promoted from within an imperfect system. The following 
policy changes could be the first steps in contributing to a less problematic 
framework of developing country differentiation: 
(i) discourage the proliferation of even more categories/classifications, to 
prevent further complexification 
(ii) streamline/rationalise/reorganise existing categories of developing 
countries within the same organisation to reduce proliferation 
(iii) extend the policy change proposed in (ii) through inter-organisational 
harmonisation/coordination efforts 
(iv) (truly) depoliticise and adopt a strictly needs-based approach to country 
selection 
(v) work towards less institutional fragmentation of efforts and more intra- 
and inter-organisational coordination 
(vi) strive for less bureaucracy-motivated representatives (and, hence, adopt 
a tighter control of their performance), in order to minimise princi-
pal/agent mismatches 
(vii) introduce more accountability measures targeted at IOs and their 
representatives 
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These changes would amount to fewer costs, more efficiency, less 
bureaucratisation, and more rationality and transparency in providing special 
treatment to developing countries and, ultimately, in global governance. 
Evidently, as with all major changes, there is the need to promote a broad 
debate on the importance of these policy measures and, most probably, 
compromise on some of them. By doing this, key stakeholders can contribute 
with the necessary goodwill and motivation towards the successful 
implementation of these policy changes. Indeed, this paper intends to be a first 
contribution in that direction. 
Finally, this paper could be extended to also contribute with regard to two 
issues. Firstly, by proposing concrete options to streamline existing categories, 
in order to avoid the current duplication of efforts and reduce the overlap. 
Secondly, by discussing the trade-off between a less complex developing 
country differentiation landscape (and, hence, increased rationality and 
transparency) and the importance of delivering customised policies for specific 
conditions faced by developing countries (e.g., landlockness, indebtedness, 
islandness, state fragility, etc.). At first glance, it does seem that less 
proliferation of classifications and less discretion in global governance can 
indeed be achieved at the expense of policy adaptation to specific development 
conditions. 
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Appendices 
Table A1 
Developing country categorisation/differentiation landscape (start of 2013) 
 LDC LLDC LIC LMIC LHD MHD HIPC FS 
Number of 
countries 49 31 35 57 46 47 39 36 
Afghanistan X X X  X  X X 
Algeria      X   
Angola X   X X   X 
Armenia  X  X     
Azerbaijan  X       
Bangladesh X  X  X    
Belize    X     
Benin X  X  X  X  
Bhutan X X  X  X   
Bolivia  X  X  X X  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina        X 
Botswana  X    X   
Burkina Faso X X X  X  X  
Burundi X X X  X  X X 
Cape Verde    X  X   
Cambodia X  X   X   
Cameroon    X X  X  
Central African 
Rep. X X X  X  X X 
Chad X X X  X  X X 
China      X   
Comoros X  X  X  X X 
Congo, Rep.    X  X X X 
Congo, Dem. Rep. X  X  X  X X 
Côte d'Ivoire    X X  X X 
Djibouti X   X X    
Dominican Rep.      X   
Egypt    X  X   
El Salvador    X  X   
Equatorial Guinea X     X   
Eritrea X  X  X  X X 
Ethiopia X X X  X  X  
Fiji    X  X   
Gabon      X   
Gambia X  X  X  X  
Georgia    X     
Ghana    X  X X  
Guatemala    X  X   
Guinea X  X  X  X X 
Guinea-Bissau X  X  X  X X 
Guyana    X  X X  
Haiti X  X  X  X X 
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Honduras    X  X X  
Indonesia    X  X   
India    X  X   
Iraq    X  X  X 
Jordan      X   
Kazakhstan  X       
Kenya   X  X    
Kiribati X   X  X  X 
Korea, Dem. Rep.   X  N/A   
Kosovo    X N/A  X 
Kyrgyzstan  X X   X   
Lao People’s Dem. 
Rep. X X  X  X   
Lesotho X X  X X    
Liberia X  X  X  X X 
Libya        X 
Macedonia  X   N/A   
Madagascar X  X  X  X  
Malawi X X X  X  X  
Maldives      X   
Mali X X X  X  X  
Marshall Is.    X N/A  X 
Mauritania X   X X  X  
Micronesia    X  X  X 
Moldova  X  X  X   
Mongolia  X  X  X   
Morocco    X  X   
Mozambique X  X  X  X  
Myanmar X  X  X   X 
Namibia      X   
Nepal X X X  X   X 
Nicaragua    X  X X  
Niger X X X  X  X  
Nigeria    X X    
Pakistan    X X    
Palestinian Territory   N/A  X   
Papua New 
Guinea    X X    
Paraguay  X  X  X   
Philippines    X  X   
Rwanda X X X  X  X  
Samoa X   X  X   
S. Tomé and 
Príncipe X   X X  X  
Senegal X   X X  X  
Sierra Leone X  X  X  X X 
Solomon Is. X   X X   X 
Somalia X  X  N/A X X 
South Africa      X   
South Sudan X X  X N/A  X 
Sri Lanka    X  X   
Suriname      X   
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Swaziland  X  X  X   
Syria    X  X  X 
Sudan X   X X  X X 
Tajikistan  X X   X   
Tanzania X  X  X  X  
Thailand      X   
Timor-Leste X   X X   X 
Togo X  X  X  X X 
Tonga    X     
Turkmenistan  X  X  X   
Tuvalu X   X N/A  X 
Uganda X X X  X  X  
Ukraine    X     
Uzbekistan  X  X  X   
Vanuatu X   X  X   
Vietnam    X  X   
West Bank and 
Gaza    X N/A  X 
Western Sahara   N/A N/A  X 
Yemen X   X X   X 
Zambia X X  X X  X  
Zimbabwe  X X  X   X 
Sources: UN, World Bank, UNDP, IMF 
Non-independent territories are in italics) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
